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What determines the level of IPO gross spreads? Underwriter
profits and the cost of going public
Abstract
This paper addresses three empirical findings of the literature on initial public offerings. (i) Why do
investment banks earn positive profits in a competitive market? (ii) Why do banks receive lower gross
spreads in venture capitalist (VC) backed than in non-VC backed IPOs? (iii) Why is underpricing more
pronounced in VC than in non-VC backed IPOs? While each phenomenon can be explained by itself,
there is no explanation yet why all three occur simultaneously. We propose an integrated theoretical
framework to address this issue. The IPO procedure is modeled as a two-stage signaling game: In the
second stage banks set offer prices given their private information and the level of the spread. Issuing
firms anticipate their bank's pricing decision and, in the first stage, set spreads to maximize expected
revenue. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are
non-negative. Firms' equilibrium spreads are large so as to induce banks to set high prices, allowing
banks to make profits. Superiorly informed VC backed firms impose smaller spreads but face larger
underpricing than non-VC backed firms.
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Abstract
This paper addresses three empirical findings of the literature on initial public
offerings. (i) Why do investment banks earn positive profits in a competitive market?
(ii) Why do banks receive lower gross spreads in venture capitalist (VC) backed than
in non-VC backed IPOs? (iii) Why is underpricing more pronounced in VC than in
non-VC backed IPOs? While each phenomenon can be explained by itself, there is
no explanation yet why all three occur simultaneously. We propose an integrated
theoretical framework to address this issue. The IPO procedure is modeled as a two-
stage signaling game: In the second stage banks set offer prices given their private
information and the level of the spread. Issuing firms anticipate their bank’s pricing
decision and, in the first stage, set spreads to maximize expected revenue. Investors
are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are non-negative.
Firms’ equilibrium spreads are large so as to induce banks to set high prices, allowing
banks to make profits. Superiorly informed VC backed firms impose smaller spreads
but face larger underpricing than non-VC backed firms.
JEL Classification: G14, G24.
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1 Introduction
A large number of reputable institutions can administer initial public offerings. The under-
writing industry should thus be highly competitive and profit margins should be low. Yet
out of all investment banking fields, the IPO business is generally recognized to be among
the most profitable. For an issuing firm (henceforth ‘firm’), on the other hand, its first
listing is usually a costly endeavor. While underpricing has been the focus of the literature,
it is not the only cost of going public.1 The ‘explicit’ price tag is the discount – the gross
spread – at which firms sell the shares to their underwriter (henceforth ‘bank’), who then
passes them on to investors at the public offer price.
The IPO market is plagued with various conflicts of interest and informational asym-
metries between the parties involved, as is well-documented – both empirically and theo-
retically – in the literature on IPO underpricing.2 Yet there is only little theoretical work3
that assesses how these conflicts and informational asymmetries affect the gross spread
level, and how the gross spread level and IPO pricing are interrelated. With this paper, we
attempt to fill this gap.
What is known empirically about gross spread levels? Chen & Ritter (2000) find that
spreads amount to 7 percent on average for a sample of 3,203 IPOs between 1985 and
1998. They report that “investment bankers readily admit that the IPO business is very
profitable.” Furthermore, spreads are not only on average but exactly 7 percent in most of
the offerings. Hansen (2001) documents that this finding triggered 27 lawsuits and a U.S.
Department of Justice investigation of “alleged conspiracy among securities underwriters
to fix underwriting fees.” Thus in practice, the spread level plays an important role, and
it allows banks to generate substantial profits.
Notwithstanding the legal debate and empirical indications on investment bank collu-
sion, our theoretical formulation allows a very different, subtle explanation for high spreads.
1Ritter & Welch (2002), for example, report an average first-day return of 18.8 percent for 6,249 IPOs
in the U.S. between 1980 and 2001.
2Ljungqvist (2005) provides a comprehensive overview of the literature.
3Exceptions are Baron (1982) and Yeoman (2001), which we discuss below.
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We find that it can be in the best interest of the firm to pay ‘high’ spreads — even if a
competing bank offered its service at a lower spread. Firms, therefore, do not bargain for
lower spreads and banks do not compete in them.
Apart from the generally high level of spreads, there are also structural differences.
Many IPOs are backed by a venture capitalist (VC). In their pioneering contribution on
the role of VCs in IPOs, Megginson & Weiss (1991) compare VC backed and non-VC
backed IPOs matched by industry and offer size between 1983 and 1987. They find that,
on average, VC backed IPOs have lower spreads than non-VC backed IPOs. In a more
recent study, Francis & Hasan (2001) confirm that VC backed IPOs are associated with
less underwriter compensation than non-VC backed IPOs. However, they, and also Lee
& Wahal (2004) and Loughran & Ritter (2004), find that VC backed IPOs exhibit larger
average underpricing than non-VC backed IPOs.4
One obvious explanation for the first finding, i.e. that a VC-backed firms face a lower
spreads, is that they are experienced, repeat players with a lot of bargaining power. But
this does not explain the second empirical finding: why would an experienced player leave
more money on the table and allow more underpricing than an inexperienced, non-VC firm?
Appealing to ‘experience’ or ‘repeated interaction’ simply cannot explain why lower spreads
and higher underpricing occur jointly. In our model, however, this arises as a natural result
of the information revelation procedure in the offering process.
In the IPO process, there are three major players: the issuing firm, the bank, and
investors. Each will react rationally to preceding actions by other players and/or in an-
ticipation of a rational response. The only meaningful way to model this situation is as
an extensive form game. Furthermore, in IPOs there is substantial uncertainty and thus
it is reasonable to model asymmetric, noisy information that is correlated among agents.
Finally, the aftermarket price should aggregate information that the offer price could not
– why else would we often observe substantial price-jumps? The nature of the problem
4These papers contrast earlier studies, e.g. Barry, Muscarella, Peavy & Vetsuypens (1990) and Meggin-
son & Weiss (1991) who found that VC backed IPOs are associated with less underpricing.
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therefore requires a model that incorporates three-player strategic considerations coupled
with informational asymmetries. We thus set up our model as a three-stage signaling game,
in which market prices aggregate more information than do offer prices.
There are drawbacks to this approach: The analysis of any three player game is intrin-
sically complex. However, complexity is a price worth paying: The model accomplishes to
exactly integrate the above described stylized facts. In addition, we derive a novel, testable
implication in that relationship-bank5 backed IPOs should have the highest spreads.
In our model, we assume that banks, investors, and issuing firms (may) have private
but noisy information about the intrinsic value of the offered security, which is either ‘good
news’ or ‘bad news’. In a wider sense, this signal can also be understood as information
about how the market perceives the firm’s fundamentals. Initially, the firm offers the
bank a contract that specifies the gross spread level. If the firm is privately informed,
the spread level can be either separating or pooling. The level of the spread critically
affects the bank’s pricing decision: Banks choose the offer price strategically to maximize
their expected profits from the gross spread of the offer revenue. A higher price does not
necessarily increase revenue: at high prices the IPO can fail as there may not be enough
investors to buy up the entire offering. Given the spread, the bank sets a price that, first,
either reveals (separation) or camouflages (pooling) its private information and, second, is
either low so that all investors order (risk-free) or high so that only investors with ‘good
news’ order (risky). Banks account for the spread’s information content when deciding on
the offer price. Anticipating the bank’s pricing decision, the firm sets the level of the gross
spread strategically so that the bank sets the offer price that gives the firm the highest
expected profit. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected
profits are non-negative.
Our first main result is to show that at the equilibrium spread the bank earns positive
profits on average. The intuition for the result is straightforward. Loosely speaking, firms
want banks to set high, risky prices. And since banks have the power to set the prices,
5A commercial bank with strong, long-lasting ties with the firm, for instance through credit-financing.
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spreads must be incentive compatible so that banks do not deviate to a low price at which
they would receive a safe, positive payoff. Therefore, a bank’s expected profit is at least
what it would gain by deviating to a low risk-free price.
Our second main result is a comparative static on the effect of a change in the informa-
tional assumptions on the spread. We distinguish two cases: in the first, the firm receives
no information (later interpreted as non-VC backed IPOs), and in the second, the firm
receives a private signal that is conditionally independent from the bank’s signal (later
interpreted as VC backed IPOs). We first show that privately informed firms set pooling
spreads that hide their signal, but that at these spreads banks set separating prices. In
contrast, uninformed firms cannot convey information through the spread, and in equilib-
rium they choose spreads that induce banks to set high, risky pooling prices. We then show
that the pooling spreads with privately informed firms are lower than the spread set by an
uninformed firm.
The intuition for these results consists of three parts: First, the spread provides in-
centives for the bank to choose risky prices. If the spread is too low, then banks avoid
the risk of a failing IPO completely and set very low, risk-free prices; at these prices there
would be a lot of underpricing. Suppose firms want to induce banks to set the risky pool-
ing price: then the spread has to be large enough so that both a low- and a high-signal
bank set risky prices. Intuitively this spread must thus be larger than spreads that induce
price-separation, and this yields the order of spread-sizes.
Second, while the high-signal firm would like to set a spread that separates it from
its low-signal counterpart, the low-signal firm can always gain so much from mimicking
the high-signal firm that there cannot be spread separation. This leads to two candidate
outcomes: one where firms set spreads that induce price-pooling, the other where firms set
spreads that induce price-separation. The high-signal firm prefers price separation because,
first, it believes that the bank also has a high signal and will thus set a high price and,
second, these spreads are also lower than the pooling-inducing spreads. In equilibrium the
high-signal, privately informed firm can then ensure the spread-pooling, price-separating
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equilibrium.
Third, uninformed firms think that with price-separation the high and the low price
would be equally likely. While spreads that induce price-separation are lower than spreads
that induce price-pooling, underpricing is larger with price-pooling. It turns out that
uninformed firms prefer the price-pooling equilibrium. Intuitively, informed firms have
an informational advantage, and, therefore, it should be cheaper for them to provide the
banks with the right incentives. Since spreads with informed and uninformed firms have the
same informational content, the informational advantage should cause spreads to induce
different equilibrium prices; hence uninformed firms’ preference for price-pooling. Spreads
that privately informed firms offer are then lower than the spreads that uninformed firms
offer.
Our third main result shows that the model is consistent with the empirical findings
on first-day returns. In equilibrium there is, on average, underpricing, and it is more
pronounced in VC than in non-VC backed offerings.
Our final result analyzes the spread level when banks and firms receive a common signal
(later interpreted as ‘relationship-banking’). We show that a firm with favorable informa-
tion sets a spread that prevents its low-signal counterpart from mimicking. However, even
the low signal firm finds it optimal to choose a spread that is large enough so that the bank
sets a high, risky price. We then find that IPOs under this informational assumption have
the highest spreads on average.
In a related theoretical paper that addresses investment bank compensation in IPOs,
Baron (1982) develops the optimal bank-compensation contract assuming that the bank is
better informed about the capital market’s demand than the issuer. The contract is geared
to resolve this information asymmetry and to induce the bank to exert a distribution effort.
Baron then allows a contract that conditions the bank’s compensation on the offer price, the
overall proceeds, and the bank’s report of market conditions. In contrast, the compensation
scheme considered in our paper is restricted to setting the level of the spread, because we
focus primarily on understanding how this key variable is determined and how it influences
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other aspects of the offer procedure. This leads to different observations: in Baron’s work, if
the issuer and the bank have the same information, then the compensation is smallest; in our
paper, the spread is largest if they have the same information. In our paper, underpricing
is largest when the issuer is independently informed (and larger than when the issuer is
uninformed); in Baron underpricing is largest if the issuer is uninformed. These differences
stems from the chosen frameworks: In our signalling model, both the spread and the
price may reveal information about the security on offer. Investors use this information in
their decisions, so that the spread and the offer price influence market demand and thus
payoffs and underpricing. In Baron, on the other hand, the market reaction is essentially
stochastically independent of the offering process. In another theoretical contribution,
Yeoman (2001) models a competitive environment in which information asymmetries play
no role and there are no strategic considerations. The size of the spread and the magnitude
of underpricing in his model are thus determined as the solution of a maximization problem
over exogenous variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes and discusses the underlying assumptions.
Section 4 derives the equilibrium prices set by the bank, given the spread level. Section 5
analyzes the strategic choice of the spread level by issuing firms. Section 6 presents the
main results on levels and differences of gross spreads. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Stylized Model of the IPO Procedure
The Security. The security on offer can take one of two equally likely values V ; for
simplicity V ∈ V = {0, 1}. The realization is not known to any player in the game.
The Investors. There are N identical, risk neutral investors who can place unit orders
of the security. Each investor receives a costless, private, conditionally i.i.d. signal si ∈ V
about the value of the security. This information is noisy, i.e. Pr(si = v|V = v) = q with
q ∈ (1
2
, 1). If an investor receives a share, his payoff is the market price minus the offer
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price, otherwise it is zero. An investor’s type is his signal, thus a ‘high-signal investor’ has
si = 1, a ‘low-signal investor’ has si = 0. Each investor maximizes his expected payoff.
The Issuing Firm. In general the issuing firm (henceforth ‘the firm’) can be either
uninformed or informed. For the latter we consider two subcases: in the first, the issuing
firm receives a private signal sf ∈ {0, 1}, in the second, the firm and the bank receive the
identical signal. Any signal is costless and conditionally independent from the investors’
signals but, for simplicity, of the same quality, i.e. Pr(sf = v|V = v) = q. The uninformed
firm receives no signal. We will refer to these types of firms as ‘privately informed’, ‘iden-
tically informed’, and ‘uninformed’. In Section 6 we interpret the meaning of informative
signals and relate informed and uninformed firms to real-world types such as VC backed
and non-VC backed firms. The firm is risk neutral and signs a contract with a bank that
delegates the pricing decision and constitutes the number of shares, S, to be sold. It also
specifies the publicly observed gross spread level β ∈ (0, 1), which is chosen by the firm.6 If
the offer is floated, its revenue is fraction (1− β) of the offer revenue, otherwise it is zero.
The objective of the firm is to maximize its expected revenue.
The Investment Bank. The risk neutral bank receives a private signal sb ∈ V about
the value of the security. This signal is costless, conditionally independent from investors’
signals, and, for simplicity, of the same quality, i.e. Pr(sb = v|V = v) = q. If sb = 1 we
refer to the bank as a ‘high-signal bank’, for sb = 0, it is a ‘low-signal bank’. After the
bank receives the contract it announces the offer price p. If the offer fails, the bank incurs
cost C.7 These costs are external to our formulation and can be thought of as a loss in
reputation or as an opportunity costs from lost market share subsequent to a failed IPO.8
6Another candidate choice variable is the number of shares S, or even the number of potential investors
N that are addressed, e.g. during the road-show. However, including these as choice variables would require
a different, more elaborate modeling approach.
7Alternatively, one can think that the bank adjusts the offer price down in case there is insufficient
demand; again one can argue that the bank then incurs a reputation loss. The model could be extended to
allow the bank to buy up unsold securities. Costs then result from expensively bought inventory positions
and not from failure. C would thus be ‘smoothed’. This would not alter our qualitative results but
complicate the analysis considerably.
8“Dunbar (2000) provides evidence that banks lose market share after withdrawn offerings. For the
issuing firm, on the other hand, we do not include costs of a failure. Clearly, if the IPO fails, then the
firm must choose a different, possibly less preferred financing or exit channel. However, since these costs
7
Without loss of generality, we do not specify any costs the offering procedure itself may
cause for the investment bank. Thus, if the offer is successful, the bank’s payoff is βpS; if
it fails, its payoff is −C. The bank’s objective is to maximize its payoff. The timing of the
game is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1 here.
The Offer. A fixed number of S < N shares is offered at a fixed price p. If the demand
d is insufficient, d < S, then the offer fails and the security does not get listed. If d ≥ S,
then the offer is successful. If it is oversubscribed, the share-allocation is pro-rated. After
the distribution, demand d is revealed, and the security is traded on the market at market
price pm.
Signaling Value of Gross Spread and Offer Price. The gross spread level and
the offer price are announced first. Then investors decide whether to order, based on their
private information and on the information that firm and bank reveal about their signals
through the gross spread level and the offer price. We denote information contained in
prices by µ(p), information in spreads by ν(β). In the case of the uninformed firm, the
spread is uninformative and only prices can carry information. In the case of an identically
informed firm, the information contained in β is hierarchical to the information in p. Firms
with different signals may set different levels of the gross spread which then reveals the
signal of the firm. Since the firm’s signal is the same as the bank’s, prices cannot carry
further information. We write µ(p) = 1 if the price reflects that the bank’s signal is sb = 1,
µ(p) = 0 if reveals that sb = 0, and µ(p) =
1
2
to indicate that the price is uninformative;
likewise for ν(β). In equilibrium these will turn out to be the only relevant cases.
Figure 2 here.
The Aftermarket Price. The equilibrium market price is determined by the aggregate
number of investors’ favorable signals. In our model this number is always revealed, either
should be small, explicitly modeling any costs that this might cost would only add another parameter to
the model without altering our findings.
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directly through investor demand or immediately after the float through trading activities.
Thus write pm(d) for the market price as a function of the number of high-signal investors
d ∈ {0, . . . , N}. Appendix A fleshes out this argument.
Investors’ Decisions and Expected Payoffs. We admit only symmetric pure strate-
gies; thus all investors with the same signal take identical decisions. These can then be
aggregated so that only three cases need to be considered: First, all investors subscribe, sec-
ond, only high-signal investors subscribe, and third, no investor subscribes. The extensive
form of the game is illustrated in Figure 2.
To compute his expected payoff, an investor has to account for the probability of receiv-
ing the security. There are two cases to consider. First, all investors buy: Market demand
is N and all investors receive the security with equal probability S/N . Second, only high-
signal investors buy: If d investors buy, each receives the security with probability S/d. If
the overall demand d is smaller than the number of shares on offer, d < S, the IPO fails
and investors who ordered the security obtain it with probability 0. These three types of
aggregate order decisions are denoted as follows: If all investors subscribe, then we use
B0,1, if only high-signal investors subscribe, then we use B1, and if no investor subscribes,
then we use B∅. Thus, the set of potential collective best replies is B := {B0,1, B1, B∅}.
If it turns out that the number of favorable signals is small then the aftermarket price
may drop below the offer price; the reverse may happen if the number of favorable signals
is large. Investors require to be compensated for the risk of low aftermarket prices; since
they are risk neutral, the benefit of an underpriced issue must be balanced with the loss
of an overpriced issue so that investors at least break even on average. Suppose only high-
signal investors buy. After observing the gross spread and the offer price, an investor’s
information set contains both his signal si and the information inferred from the offer price
and the spread, µ(p) and ν(β). Since signals are conditionally i.i.d., for each V ∈ V there
is a different distribution over the number d of others’ favorable signals (si = 1). Investors
combine these densities with their own signal to determine the distribution over the number
of others’ favorable signals. An investor orders if at price p his rational-expectation payoff
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from buying is non-negative (details are in Appendix A),
E[market price (demand d)− offer price | signal, spread-price info, IPO successful] ≥ 0. (1)
Threshold Prices. Denote by psi,µ,ν the highest price that an investor with signal si,
price information µ(p) and spread-information ν(β) is willing to pay in equilibrium if all
investors with signals weakly larger than si order. If the firm is uninformed, ν is replaced
with a diamond, ⋄. If firm and bank get the same signal and if the firm signals its private
information, µ(p) is replaced with a diamond to indicate that the price cannot reveal further
information. Suppose the firm reveals information ν. For example, p1,1,ν is the price at
which the bank signals that it has received information s = 1 (thus the price is separating)
and it is the largest such price at which only the high-signal investors are willing to buy;
p1, 1
2
,ν is the highest price at which banks reveal no information (they pool) and only the
high-signal investors buy. Note that at all these prices investors are aware that the security
price may drop (or rise) in the aftermarket and that they may not get the security. The
threshold prices are formally derived in Appendix A.
The Bank’s Expected Payoff. With binary signals, the probability that d investors
have the favorable signal and N − d have not, conditional on true value V , is binomial.
The unconditional distribution, which convolutes the high and low value case, is bimodal.
The bank is interested in the cumulative probability that there are at least S investors with
the favorable signal (recall that S denotes the number of shares on offer), given its own
information and the information it derived from the spread. We use notation αsb,ν(S) for
this cumulative probability; details of its functional form are in Appendix A.
If the bank sets a price p at which only high-signal investors buy, then the bank’s
expected profit is
Π(p|sb, ν, B1) = αsb,ν(S) · βpS− (1− αsb,ν(S)) · C. (2)
If the offer price is low enough so that all investors are willing to buy, irrespective of their
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signals (case B0,1), then the offer never fails and payoffs are given by Π(p|B0,1) = βpS.
If the price is set so high that no investor buys (case B∅) then a loss of C results with
certainty. Consequently, a necessary condition for the bank to be willing to set a high, risky
price at which only high-signal investors buy, is that the expected share of the proceeds
αsb,ν(S) · βpS at least compensates the bank for the risk of a failed IPO, measured by
expected costs (1− αsb,ν(S)) · C.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
The derivation of the equilibrium in any signaling game, albeit indispensable and insightful,
can be cumbersome at times. We thus list the equilibrium outcomes before we derive them
in detail. Some readers may want (in a first read) to skip Sections 4 and 5 and proceed
directly to Section 6, where we discuss the implications of the equilibrium behavior.
The Equilibrium Concept and Selection Criteria. The equilibrium concept for
this signaling game is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common problem with
signaling PBEs is the multiplicity of equilibria, some being supported by “unreasonable”
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The most intuitive equilibrium, is the one in which the least
surplus is lost through costly signalling (sometimes called the ‘Riley-outcome’). To single
out this outcome, we only consider equilibria that satisfy Cho & Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive
Criterion. If this does not yield a unique outcome, then we select the equilibrium that is
payoff dominant for the agent who takes the signaling action.
The Equilibrium. The timing of the game is as described in Figure 1. First, all
parties receive their private signals (if informed). Second, the firm offers a contract to the
bank that specifies the gross spread. Third, the bank sets the offer price given the spread,
the information contained therein, and its own signal. Fourth, investors decide whether or
not to order (using all the information available to them). Finally, in case the IPO takes
place, the number of favorable signals is revealed in the aftermarket and the price adjusts
accordingly. The following outcomes arise as equilibria.
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Summary (Equilibrium Predictions)
(1) If the firm is uninformed, then it will set a spread that induces the bank to set a
pooling price. At the pooling price, only investors with the high signal buy.
(2) If the firm receives a private, conditionally independent signal, then it sets a spread
that does not reflect its information. This spread induces the bank to set a separating
price (which reveals the bank’s information). At the high separating price, only high-
signal investors order, at the low separating price all investors order.
(3) If the firm has the same signal as the bank, then the firm will set a separating spread
that reveals the firm’s (and thus the bank’s) information. Both separating spreads in-
duce prices at which only high-signal investors order.
The equilibrium is derived by backward induction. In Section 4 we analyze the price setting
of the bank given the level of the gross spread. Anticipating the bank’s price setting, the
firm chooses the spread, and we derive the details of this choice process in Section 5. Section
6 interprets the findings of Sections 4 and 5 and presents our main results on banking profits
and differences in spread levels for different classes of issuing firms.
Simplifying Assumptions. There are four restrictive assumptions. We make these
assumptions for two reasons. First, we want to keep the analysis tractable and strive to
obtain approximate closed form solutions for success-probabilities and prices. The first
three assumptions allow this (see Appendix A). Second, to keep our statements concise,
we make the fourth assumption where we restrict the spread level not to exceed 10 percent,
which is consistent with empirically observed levels.
The unconditional distribution over favorable signals is a composite of the two condi-
tional distributions and thus bimodal. The two modes of the distribution over favorable
signals are centered around N(1− q) and Nq. We now require
Assumption 1 S = (1− q)N.
Nothing speaks against an analysis with a different number of shares (as long as the number
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is below N/2), but then the model can only be solved numerically. The assumption is
conceptually innocuous, yet helps to keep the analysis tractable.9
For every signal quality q, there exists an N˜(q) so that for all N > N˜(q) the two
conditional distributions over favorable signals generated by V = 0 and V = 1 do not
‘overlap’. By standard results from statistics, a sufficient condition for N˜(q) is given by
N˜(q) > 64q(1− q)/(2q − 1)2.
Assumption 2 The number of investors N is larger than N˜(q).
As a consequence of the second assumption we can apply the Law of Large Numbers (LLN)
and DeMoivre-Laplace’s Theorem. Since we assume that the IPO fails whenever d < S,
Assumption 1 implies, for instance, that if the spread is uninformative, i.e. ν = 1/2, then
α0, 1
2
(S) = (2 − q)/2 and α1, 1
2
= (1 + q)/2.10 In what follows we omit S from α. Another
consequence of N being large is that pm(d) ∈ {0, 1} for almost all values of d.11 That is,
market prices will be fully informative and reflect the true value.
Assumption 3 Signals are sufficiently precise, q ∈ (.6, 1).
Another simplifying and useful feature in our analysis is that we can describe closed form
approximations for the threshold offering prices. When signals are very imprecise (q is close
to 0.5), however, then our closed form approximation for prices can no longer be applied12
9Allowing S to be the firm’s or bank’s choice variable is a different matter. In that case, there would
be a two-dimensional signal and, conceptually, this changes the model and the analysis substantially.
10The probability of a successful IPO is determined by computing how likely it is that demand d is larger
than S = N(1− q). The underlying distribution is a (bimodal) binomial distribution and as such the two
modes are generally not exactly symmetric around the centers of their modes (which are N(1 − q) and
Nq). However, if N is large enough so that 0 < q ± 2
√
q(1− q)/N < 1 then by DeMoivre-LaPlace the
binomial distribution can be approximated by the normal distribution. The latter is symmetric and thus
we can treat each mode to be symmetric. This then allows simple closed-form expressions for the success
probabilities as derived in Appendix A.
11To be more precise, for d≫ N/2, pm(d) = 1, and for d≪ N/2, pm(d) = 0.
12The reason is the following: The threshold price approximations are formed by computing the condi-
tional expectation in equation (1). The market price is a function of the number of positive signals and it
is S-shaped (around N/2); further, it is 0 for a small number of positive signals and 1 for a large number
of positive signals. The probability density used to compute this expectation is bimodal with modes at
N(1− q) and Nq, and for large N the probability mass is tightly concentrated around the centers of these
modes. The crucial idea behind the approximations is to observe that for q sufficiently large, positive
probability mass occurs only when the price is either 0 or 1. When q is close to 1/2, however, then this is
no longer true and thus closed forms are not feasible.
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and consequently the equilibrium analysis would become cumbersome. In principle, all that
we require is that the signal quality is distinctively better than random; this seems a small
burden given that the closed form approximations are very useful for the analysis (and
potentially even beyond this paper). For a concise analysis, we make a fourth assumption.
Assumption 4 Spread levels β do not exceed 10 percent.
Empirically observed spreads typically range from 2 and 9 percent, and so we merely
restrict attention to the real-world observed range of values. To assess the implications of
this assumption consider the following. In our model, the threshold spreads (which we will
derive in the next two sections) depend on two variables: The costs per potential investor,
C/N , and the signal precision q. The first variable, C/N , is an exogenous factor in our
model; there is no equilibrium condition that specifies or restricts its size. Imposing an
upper bound on β is implicitly the same as requiring C/N to be sufficiently small for any q.
(Details are in Appendices A and B.)
While an analysis with larger spreads is possible, the derivation of the equilibria and
the exposition of the results would involve an unwarrantably large number of case distinc-
tions. Thus, instead of fully solving the model for all possible parameter constellations
and then characterizing the parameter set for which our results apply, we restrict the al-
lowed parameter set ex ante, provide an empirically backed interpretation of that condition
(namely that empirically β < 0.1), and then derive the unique equilibrium within this set.
Assumption 4 is thus merely a sufficient condition for which our results hold.
4 The Investment Bank’s Equilibrium Price Choice
There are two cases to consider: First, spreads are uninformative or reflect the firm’s
independent information. In that case, the bank plays a signaling game and needs to
decide whether or not to reveal its private information. Second, in case of the identically
informed firm, spreads can reveal the bank’s signal. Then the bank has no strategic decision
problem but merely chooses the price that is optimal given all public information.
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4.1 Equilibrium Price Setting when Spreads are Uninformative
or Reveal Independent Information
In the following we identify the conditions under which a profit maximizing bank reveals its
information through the offer price. A separating equilibrium is defined as informationally
efficient since investors can derive the bank’s signal from the offer price. Hence a pooling
equilibrium is informationally inefficient. In this case, investors decide only on the basis
of their private signals. In what follows we take the information that may be contained in
spreads, ν(β), as given. Separation and pooling thus always refers to prices.
A pooling equilibrium in prices is specified through (i) an equilibrium offer price p∗ from
which investors infer (ii) price-information µ = 1
2
, and (iii) investors’ best replies given
their private signals, µ, and p∗. A separating equilibrium in prices is (i) a system of prices
{p∗, p¯∗} and price-information such that (ii) at p∗ = p¯∗, the high separation price, the price-
information is that the bank has the favorable signal, µ = 1, at p∗ = p∗, the low separation
price, the price-information is that the bank has the low signal, µ = 0, and (iii) investors’
best replies given their private signals, µ, and p¯∗ or p∗. In both separating and pooling
equilibrium, for p 6∈ {p¯∗, p∗} or p 6= p∗, respectively, out-of-equilibrium public beliefs are
chosen ‘appropriately’. The following result is a straightforward consequence of signaling,
the proof of which is in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 (The Highest Possible Low Separating Price)
There exists no PBE (price-)separating offer price p∗ > p0,0,ν.
In any separating equilibrium, therefore, the low price must be such that all investors
buy, and the highest such separating price, given price-information µ = 0, is p∗ = p0,0,ν . In
what follows we refer to p0,0,ν as the low separation price.
In our setting there are three types of price-signaling equilibria: The already mentioned
separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal investors buy, and
a pooling equilibrium in which all investors buy. In the following, we characterize the
conditions guaranteeing that only separating equilibria survive our selection criterion.
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Fix a candidate safe price p ∈ [p0,0,ν , p0, 1
2
,ν], the interval of potential pooling prices
at which all investors would buy. Define φ1,ν(p) as the price at which the high-signal
bank would be indifferent between charging a risky price φ1,ν(p) at which only high-signal
investors buy, and a safe pooling price p with all investors buying. Formally,
α1,νβφ1,ν(p)S− (1− α1,ν) C = βpS ⇔ φ1,ν(p) =
p
α1,ν
+
1− α1,ν
α1,ν
C
βS
. (3)
Price φ0,ν(p) is defined analogously for the low-signal bank. Thus price φsb,ν(p) is the
lowest risky price that a bank with signal sb is willing to deviate to from safe price p. In
what follows we refer to φ1,ν(p) as the high-signal bank’s deviation price, and to φ0,ν(p) as
the low-signal bank’s deviation price. It is straightforward to see that the low-signal bank
requires a higher price as compensation for risk taking, and that, the higher the pooling
price, the higher the lowest profitable deviation price. In what follows we analyze equilibria
depending on two conditions on primitives.
Condition 1 The high-signal bank’s deviation price from the highest safe pooling price is
not higher than the highest separating price, φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) ≤ p1,1,ν .
Condition 2 The low-signal bank’s deviation price from the low separating price is not
smaller than the highest risky pooling price, φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) ≥ p1, 1
2
,ν.
These two conditions will determine what kind of equilibrium (separating or pooling)
arises. While this section focusses on prices, Section 5 focusses on spreads. In Section
5.1 we provide an intuitive interpretation of the two conditions in terms of the gross spread
level. Effectively, the higher the gross spread, the lower the deviation price (this transpires
straightforwardly from (3)): thus since the conditions ensure whether there is pooling or
separation, there will be threshold spreads that ensure pooling or separation.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Price Setting)
(a) If both Condition 1 and 2 are fulfilled then the unique PBE that satisfies the IC is
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the separating equilibrium {(p∗ = p0,0,ν , µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯
∗ = min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)},
µ = 1, B1); (p 6= {p
∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0,ν , B1 if p0,0,ν < p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)}.
(b) If Condition 1 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the IC and payoff
dominance is the pooling equilibrium {(p∗ = p0, 1
2
,ν , µ =
1
2
, B0,1); (p 6= p0, 1
2
,ν , µ = 0,
B1 if p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)} in which all investors buy.
(c) If Condition 2 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the IC and payoff
dominance is the pooling equilibrium {(p∗ = p1, 1
2
,ν , µ =
1
2
, B1); (p 6= p1, 1
2
,ν , µ = 0,
B1 if p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)} in which only high-signal investors buy.
Condition 1 together with the intuitive criterion (IC) is necessary and sufficient to rule
out pooling equilibria in which all investors buy, irrespective of their signals. Condition 2
ensures that there is no pooling where only investors with ‘good news’ buy.
The IC itself ensures that the high-signal bank always charges the highest sustainable
separating price. The high separation price p¯∗ is the minimum of p1,1,ν and φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). The
bank cannot charge more than p1,1,ν , and it cannot credibly charge more than φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)
as otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate. Finally, since φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) < φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) ≤
p1,1,ν , the high-signal bank is willing to separate.
If Condition 1 is violated not even the high-signal bank wants to take the risk of setting a
price where only high-signal investors buy. A separating price pair with all investors buying
at both prices cannot be an equilibrium. The bank charging the lower price always had an
incentive to deviate to the higher price since the success probability remains unchanged.
Payoff dominance for banks together with the IC then ensures that the highest pooling
price at which all investors buy results as the unique equilibrium outcome.
If Condition 2 is violated also the low-signal bank wants to set a high price at which only
high-signal investors buy. A separating price pair with only high-signal investors buying
at both prices cannot be an equilibrium. Again, the bank charging the lower price always
had an incentive to deviate. Under payoff dominance only the highest such pooling price
survives as the unique equilibrium.
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4.2 Equilibrium Price Setting when Spreads Reveal the Firm’s
and the Bank’s Identical Information
If an identically informed firm reveals its information, the bank has no more control over
the the price’s signaling value – the information is already out. We signify this by including
a diamond, ⋄, instead of µ(p) in threshold prices psi,⋄,ν . The bank continues to choose the
price that, given its private information, maximizes expected profit. Now, however, a low-
signal bank can no longer mimic a high-signal bank because investors have inferred the
bank’s signal form the spread.
Suppose the firm (and thus also the bank) has signal sf = 0 and spread-information is
‘bad news’, ν(β) = 0. Then high-signal investors are not willing to pay more than p1,⋄,0 as
risky price at which only high-signal investors buy. Price p0,⋄,0 is the highest safe price at
which all investors buy. However, if the spread is high enough, the risk of a failing IPO
may still be outweighed by expected potential gains. If β is large enough such that
risky profits at p1,⋄,0 ≥ riskless profits at p0,⋄,0 ⇔ α⋄,0βSp1,⋄,0 − (1− α⋄,0)C ≥ βSp0,⋄,0 (4)
then the low-signal bank will choose risky price p1,⋄,0. Denote the minimal spread such
that (4) holds by β0, where the subscript indicates the bank’s/firm’s signal. The high-
signal bank faces a similar choice if spread-information is ν(β) = 1. If the spread is too
low, it would rather choose a safe price. Here, the highest riskless price is p0,⋄,1, as at this
price low-signal investors will buy, given they believe that the bank’s/firm’s signal is ‘good
news’. The high-signal bank only chooses risky price p1,⋄,1 if β is so large that
risky profits at p1,⋄,1 ≥ riskless profits at p0,⋄,1 ⇔ α⋄,1βSp1,⋄,1 − (1− α⋄,1)C ≥ βSp0,⋄,1. (5)
Using the same notation, the minimal spread such that (5) holds is denoted by β1. The
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respective threshold spreads are given by
β0 =
1− α⋄,0
α⋄,0p1,⋄,0 − p0,⋄,0
C
S
and β1 =
1− α⋄,1
α⋄,1p1,⋄,1 − p0,⋄,1
C
S
. (6)
It is straightforward to check that the low signal-spread must be larger than the high-
signal spread, β0 − β1 = (2(1− q))
−1C/S > 0. Consequently, if spreads are separating and
sufficiently large, the bank will set risky prices.
5 The Firm’s Strategic Choice of the Gross Spread
As with the bank, the analysis is split into two parts. In the first, the firm is uninformed
and thus not involved in strategic signaling. It will set the spread such that the bank
sets revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices. In the second part, the firm does have private
information, so it is involved in a signaling game. It anticipates the behavior of the bank
and the investors, and sets spreads strategically to maximize its expected revenue.
5.1 Equilibrium Spreads if the Firm is Uninformed
For the bank, the choice of equilibrium prices critically depends on Conditions 1 and 2
from Proposition 1. In the following we give an intuitive interpretation of the equilibrium
outcome in terms of the gross spread, demonstrating how the spread affects these conditions.
We then derive the uninformed firm’s decision about the spread level. As before we indicate
that the firm is uninformed by replacing ν with a diamond.
An Intuitive Characterization of the Equilibrium. The concept of deviation
prices φsb,⋄ is a convenient tool to describe restrictions. We now reformulate Conditions 1
and 2 from Proposition 1 in terms of the gross spread β. This allows us to derive a
simple linear descriptive characterization of the equilibrium. Consider first Condition 1,
19
φ1,⋄(p0, 1
2
,⋄) ≤ p1,1,⋄. If β is so low that the condition does not hold,
φ1,⋄(p0, 1
2
,⋄) =
p0, 1
2
,⋄
α1,⋄
+
1− α1,⋄
α1,⋄
C
βS
> p1,1,⋄ (7)
then the separating equilibrium cannot be sustained and the pooling equilibrium in p0, 1
2
,⋄
prevails. In other words, if the gross spread is low then the incentive to set a high and thus
risky price is reduced whereas the cost of failure remains unchanged. The threshold value
for β such that for spreads below this threshold not even the high-signal bank sets a risky
price is given by
βs⋄ =
1− α1,⋄
α1,⋄p1,1,⋄ − p0, 1
2
,⋄
C
S
. (8)
Variable βs⋄ thus denotes the lowest uninformative spread such that the two types of
bank separate in prices, indicated by subscript ⋄ and superscript s. More generally, from
now on the superscript on β indicates what the spread induces the bank to do, the sub-
script indicates the information conveyed through the spread. Consider now Condition 2,
φ0,⋄(p0,0,⋄) ≥ p1, 1
2
,⋄. If β is so high that price separation is payoff-dominated
φ0,⋄(p0,0,⋄) =
p0,0,⋄
α0,⋄
+
1− α0,⋄
α0,⋄
C
βS
< p1, 1
2
,⋄ (9)
then a price-separating equilibrium, again, cannot be sustained and the price-pooling equi-
librium in p1, 1
2
,⋄ prevails. In this case the gross spread is so high that even the low-signal
bank is willing to take the risk of failure and set a high price at which only high-signal
investors buy. For the high-signal bank it becomes too costly to uphold separation, i.e. it
would have to lower the high separation price so much that it prefers pooling. The lowest
uninformative spread such that pooling in a high, risky price results is given by13
βp⋄ =
1− α0,⋄
α0,⋄p1, 1
2
,⋄ − p0,0,⋄
C
S
(10)
13Notice that the lowest spread that induces the bank to pool in a low, riskless price is always zero.
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Finally, there exists a βˆs⋄ ∈ [β
s
⋄, β
p
⋄ ] such that the deviation price of the low-signal bank is
just p1,1,⋄, i.e. for values of β above βˆ
s
⋄ the high-signal bank must lower its high separation
price in order to uphold separation. The following Corollary to Proposition 1 summarizes
the above characterization. Figure 3 offers an illustration of the corollary.
Figure 3 here.
Corollary 1 (Proposition 1 in Terms of the Gross Spread)
If spreads are uninformative and β ∈ [βs⋄, β
p
⋄) then the unique equilibrium is the separating
equilibrium in Proposition 1. If β ∈ [βs⋄, βˆ
s
⋄] then p¯
∗ = p1,1,⋄, and if β ∈ (βˆ
s
⋄, β
p
⋄) then
p¯∗ = φ0,⋄(p0,0,⋄). If β < β
s
⋄ pooling in p0, 1
2
,⋄ prevails. If β ≥ β
p
⋄ there is pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄.
Strategic Choice of the Gross Spread. If the firm is uninformed, its strategic choice
of spreads conveys no information. For every spread, however, the firm knows the best
response of both types of banks. Consequently, the firm has to choose the spread level
that maximizes its overall expected payoff. If it sets the spread too low, even a bank with
favorable information chooses a low, risk-free price. If spreads are high, the firms get a
smaller share of the revenue. Furthermore, for large spreads the high-signal bank may be
unable to set a separating price. Payoff dominance for the first mover (the firm) ensures
that out of all βs triggering separation or pooling, the firm will always choose the smallest
one. In particular, to get pooling in the risk-free price p0, 1
2
,⋄, the firm can set the spread
equal to zero. The firm then has the choice between the following expected profits
(1− βs⋄)
α1,⋄p1,1,⋄ + p0,0,⋄
2
S, p0, 1
2
,⋄ S, and (1− β
p
⋄)
α0,⋄ + α1,⋄
2
p1, 1
2
,⋄ S (11)
in price-separation, low risk-free price-pooling, and high risky price-pooling, respectively.
To find the equilibrium spreads, one has to compare the firm’s payoffs for given equilibrium
spreads. This leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 (Gross Spreads with Uninformed Firms)
There is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance: The uninformed
firm offers a contract with β = βp⋄ and both types of bank set pooling offer price p1, 1
2
,⋄.
The choice of β follows from the comparison of the respective expected profits. The resulting
price-setting by banks follows from Proposition 1. For the result to hold, we thus must
have that (i) pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄ is more profitable than separation, i.e.
(1− βp⋄)
α0,⋄ + α1,⋄
2
p1, 1
2
,⋄ S ≥ (1− β
s
⋄)
α1,⋄p1,1,⋄ + p0,0,⋄
2
S (12)
and (ii) pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄ is more profitable for the firm than pooling in p0, 1
2
,⋄, i.e.
(1− βp⋄)
α0,⋄ + α1,⋄
2
p1, 1
2
,⋄ S ≥ p0, 1
2
,⋄ S. (13)
Making use of the closed form expressions for prices and success probabilities that are
derived in Appendix A, there are essentially three free variables: q, N and C. We treat
C/N , the costs per potential investors as one variable, since in all payoff conditions they
always enter as a ratio. To check our results, both conditions can be described as functions
of C/N and q. Restricting β to be smaller than 10 percent allows to cap the functions
that form the restrictions, and it ensures that high, risky pooling is in expectation more
profitable than separation. Furthermore, numerically it can easily be checked that if high
risky pooling is better than separation, it is also better than low, risk-free pooling. The
details are in Appendix B.
5.2 Equilibrium Spreads if the Firm is Independently Informed
Suppose now that the firm gets its own, private signal, sf , conditionally independent from
all signals si and sb. Then the signaling game has two stages. In the first, the firm may
or may not signal its information. Bank and investors incorporate this information. In
the second stage, the bank chooses its equilibrium price, which may or may not reveal the
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bank’s private signal. The following cases may arise as equilibrium:
1. The firm pools in spreads and the bank separates in prices, pools in a riskless price
p0, 1
2
, 1
2
, or pools in a risky price p1, 1
2
, 1
2
.
2. The firm separates in spreads, and
(a) given a low-signal firm ν = 0, the bank separates in p1,1,0 or p0,0,0, pools in p1, 1
2
,0,
or pools in p0, 1
2
,0, and
(b) given a high-signal firm, ν = 1, the bank separates in p1,1,1 or p0,0,1, pools in
p1, 1
2
,1, or pools in p0, 1
2
,1.
The bank’s equilibrium price setting given the spread-information is covered in Proposi-
tion 1, the firm’s optimal spread-choice, anticipating this reaction, is analyzed now.
Analogously to Corollary 1 we can determine threshold levels for the gross spread such
that banks just set the low pooling price, separating prices, or the high pooling price. The
lowest spread that induces banks to set the low pooling price is β = 0. The two other
threshold levels are denoted by βsν for separation and β
p
ν for risky pooling.
The firm’s strategic choice of the spread follows from the comparison of the respective
profits. As it turns out, there are no spread-separating equilibria, i.e. firms always pool
in the spread. Furthermore, the equilibrium pooling spread induces the bank to play a
separating equilibrium in prices.
Proposition 3 (Gross Spreads with Independently Informed Firms)
The unique equilibrium is a spread-pooling equilibrium: Both types of firm offer a contract
with β = βs1
2
and banks separate by setting prices p1,1, 1
2
and p0,0, 1
2
. At p1,1, 1
2
, investors hold
price-spread-information µ = 1 and ν = 1
2
and only investors with si = 1 buy. At p0,0, 1
2
,
investors hold price-spread-information µ = 0 and ν = 1
2
and all investors buy.
To prove the claim we proceed counterfactual: We first describe spreads and price-choices in
a spread-separating equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium cannot satisfy incentive
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compatibility for the low-signal firm — it would always deviate and mimic the high-signal
firm. The underlying reason is, that the high firm would set its separating spread so that it
induces risky pooling prices; the low signal firm would also set spreads in this manner. But
since the risk is the same, a low-signal firm would prefer the higher price that is set with
the high-signal firm, a contradiction. Furthermore, the high-signal firm cannot defend its
position by setting a spread that induces price-separation (which is less preferred than the
price-pooling inducing spread). We then show that only spread-pooling can result. There
will be two candidates for spread-pooling: The first spread induces price-pooling, the second
price-separation. However, only price-separation satisfies incentive compatibility. Details
of the proof are in Appendix B.
5.3 Equilibrium Spreads if the Firm is Identically Informed
If the firm pools in spreads, price setting by the bank is as in Subsection 4.1. If the spread,
however, is informative the bank has no strategic considerations in its optimal price choice:
Its signal is the same as the firm’s that has just revealed its information. The high-signal
bank does not have to defend itself against the low-signal bank. In Subsection 4.2 we have
already described the bank’s price setting in this case.
Proposition 4 (Gross Spreads with Identically Informed Firms)
There exists a unique equilibrium which is a spread-separating equilibrium:
(a) The identically informed low-signal firm sets spread β0 and the bank sets price p1,⋄,0.
Investors derive information ν(β) = 0, and only those with signal si = 1 buy.
(b) The identically informed high-signal firm sets spread β1 and the bank sets price p1,⋄,1.
Investors derive information ν(β) = 1 and only those with signal si = 1 buy.
The respective threshold spreads were derived in Subsection 4.2. The proof of the
proposition now follows in three steps. First, we derive the conditions under which each
type of firm is satisfied with the bank choosing the risky price at the proposed spreads. The
conditions ensure that expected payoffs are higher than those from setting zero spreads.
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Second, we show that the spreads are proof to deviations, so that no type of firm wants to
mimic the other, and no type favors playing out of equilibrium spreads. Third, we show
that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Details are in Appendix B.
To summarize, if the firm has the identical signal as the bank, it plays a separating
equilibrium in which both low- and high-signal firm set spreads at which the bank sets a
risky price. Notice that this is the only informationally efficient case where prices contain
all existing information. In the case with uninformed firms, banks pool in prices; in the
case with independently informed firms, spreads are pooling.
6 Results and Interpretation
In this paper, we address three issues: First, why do banks make positive profits in a
competitive market? Second, why do VC backed IPOs have lower spreads? Third, why, as
recent evidence shows, are VC backed IPOs more underpriced than non-VC backed IPOs?
In the following we argue that our model integrates all there phenomena. Furthermore, we
address implications of the model on the level of spreads when a commercial bank conducts
the IPO of a former client (‘relationship’ banking).
In Sections 4 and 5 we derived the equilibrium prices and spreads for three different infor-
mational scenarios: firms are either uninformed, or independently informed, or identically
informed. We will now argue that these three informational scenarios can be reinterpreted
as situations with non-VC backed, VC backed, and relationship-banking IPOs, respectively.
6.1 Investment Banking Profits
It is difficult to obtain direct data on banking profits; Chen & Ritter (2000) argue that
there are economies of scale in underwriting IPOs, so spreads should be declining in the size
of the offer. Yet they don’t — spreads do not differ in offerings with revenue between $20
million and $80 million. Since banks at least break even in small offerings large offerings
must be profitable.
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In our model, equilibrium spreads allow banks positive profits in all three informational
scenarios. The intuition for this result can be seen as follows. Firms have a keen interest
that banks set high prices, as they receive almost always more than 90 percent of the
revenue. At high prices, however, only high-signal investors buy, rendering such prices
risky. Spreads, therefore, have to be sufficiently high so that banks are compensated for
the risk of failure. This effect by itself should leave banks only with zero expected profits.
However, spreads must be incentive compatible so that banks set high prices and do not
deviate to a risk-free low price: Once firms have set the level of the spread, banks can
always set a low, riskless price at which all investors buy, so that they receive their revenue
share with certainty. A bank’s expected profit, therefore, is always at least what it would
gain by deviating to a low risk-free price. It follows that banks earn positive profits.
Proposition 5 (Positive Profits for Investment Banks)
Investment banks enjoy positive profits that will not disappear in the face of competition.
The second part of the proposition claims that the positive profits would not disappear if
there was competition among banks. To see this, suppose that a competing bank offers to
conduct the IPO at a lower spread than specified in the initial contract. The firm would
not accept: even though it would receive a higher fraction of the revenue, a lower spread
would trigger a different equilibrium price, leading to lower payoffs.
In our model, banks have full discretion over the offer price. Firms must, therefore,
set incentive compatible spreads. In reality banks do not have full discretion over prices
and many offerings fail because firm and bank cannot agree on the offer price.14 However,
our qualitative result does not hinge upon the assumption that banks have full discretion.
Banks have a good deal of power and influence when it comes to price setting, and this is
all that is needed for the qualitative result to hold.
Our model provides one explanation why equilibrium spreads may be high and thus
why there may be substantial profits for investment banks — but there are also other ex-
planations for this phenomenon. Collusion among banks could be one explanation: Hansen
14See Busaba, Benveniste & Guo (2001).
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(2001), for example, reports that Chen and Ritter’s results triggered a large number of
lawsuits over alleged collusion. What our analysis suggests, is that even if banks compete
in the spread level, spreads may still be ‘high’.
Furthermore, there is recent evidence on IPO allocation practices15 suggesting that
several parties share IPO profits across several offerings.16 Consequently, investment banks
may have other sources of profits besides the gross spread that we do not model in this
paper. Instead, our model argues that even if there were no such other profit opportunities,
investment banks would still enjoy positive profits in an competitive equilibrium where all
parties involved behave rationally.
6.2 Spread Levels
Megginson & Weiss (1991) were the first to report that spreads are significantly lower in
VC backed IPOs than in non-VC backed IPOs. They show for their sample of 640 IPOs
between 1983 and 1987 that gross spreads for VC backed firms amount to 7.4 percent
whereas they are 8.2 percent for non-VC backed firms. Francis & Hasan (2001) also find
significant differences (though of smaller magnitude).
Signals provide information about the asset’s true fundamental value. The true liq-
uidation value affects the aftermarket price pm through the distribution of signals, i.e. if
the true value is high, by the law of large numbers, there will be substantially more high
than low signals (the reverse if the true value is low). Signals are conditionally i.i.d.,
unconditionally, however, signals are correlated. That is, if the bank receives, say, a high
signal, it updates its belief about the fundamental value and regards it as likely that there
will be more investors with the high than with the low signal. In this sense, signals can also
be interpreted as information about how the market is going to perceive the fundamental
value of the security on offer.
15See Loughran & Ritter (2002), Loughran & Ritter (2004), Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel & Wiener (2006),
Nimalendran, Ritter & Zhang (2007), and Reuter (2006).
16For instance, founding shareholders of one issuing firm may receive allocations in another ‘hot’ IPO in
return for agreeing to underprice their own IPO.
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Therefore, it also seems reasonable to assert that a firm, being managed by a technically
skilled, yet financially inexperienced founder-owner, is uninformed. Venture capitalists, on
the other hand, are financial institutions and so they should be able to assess the market’s
valuation. As the venture capitalist usually holds relevant control rights, we interpret the
independently informed firm to be a VC backed issuer, whereas we interpret the uninformed
firm to be the non-VC backed issuer. Banks hold private information because they closely
interact with investors, for example during the road show, and thus are informed about the
market’s valuation of the firm on offer.
Proposition 6 (VC Backed Firms set Lower Gross Spreads)
VC backed firms set lower levels of the gross spread than non-VC backed firms.
To prove this result we have to compare the equilibrium spreads derived in Proposition 3
(independently informed firms = VC backed) with the spreads from Proposition 2 (unin-
formed firms = non-VC backed). Proposition 3 identifies that in equilibrium, independently
informed firms pool in spreads but these spreads induce banks to separate in prices; Propo-
sition 2 shows that uninformed firms offer spreads so that the bank sets a high, risky pooling
price. Table 1 summarizes the results from Sections 4 (price-setting) and 5 (spread-choice).
Generally speaking, to induce risky price-pooling, firms have to give up a larger share of
their revenue than for price-separation, because in risky price-pooling the low-signal bank
needs a sufficient incentive to set a risky price.
Table 1 here.
So why do VC backed firms pool in spreads? Intuitively, a VC backed firm with ‘good
news’ finds it likely that the bank will also receive ‘good news’, and it wants the bank to
confer this information to investors via separating prices. The high-signal VC backed firm
also considers it likely that there are enough high-signal investors such that the IPO will
not fail at the risky separation price. So it favors price separation. At the same time,
however, spread-separation is not an equilibrium: the high-signal VC backed firm’s spread
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would be lower than the low-signal firm’s spread and a firm with ‘bad news’ can cheaply
mimic the ‘good news’ firm’s behavior. Non-VC backed firms, however, prefer risky price
pooling; Proposition 7 below offers one rationale for non-VC backed firms’ behavior because
with risky price-pooling, there is on average no underpricing whereas with price-separation,
there is.
6.3 Underpricing
Even though underpricing is not the main focus of this paper, the analysis allows predictions
about the relative size of first-day returns in different classes of IPOs (VC vs. non-VC
backed). In this model underpricing is the difference between the market price pm and
the offer price p. In the following we show that our model is consistent with empirically
observed patterns of first-day returns, in particular with respect to VC backed issues being
more underpriced than non-VC backed issues.17
Proposition 7 (Underpricing)
VC backed issues are on average more underpriced than non-VC backed issues.
The market price is, by the LLN, almost always either 0 or 1. With offer prices p ∈ (0, 1)
the offer is thus either overpriced and first-day returns are given by −p, or it is underpriced
and returns are 1 − p. To prove Proposition 7, we compute the ex-ante combination of
these two cases, i.e. the average before signals are being distributed. The threshold offer
prices are set so that the lowest investor type who orders breaks even in expectation.
The intuition behind underpricing is as follows: Both types of investors only buy if
their expected payoffs are non-negative. Take the case where spreads are uninformative and
prices separating (as occurs with VC backed issuers). At p0,0, 1
2
the low-signal investor breaks
even in expectation whereas the high-signal investor expects a strictly positive payoff. At
p1,1, 1
2
the high-signal investor merely breaks even and the low-signal investor abstains. Ex-
ante, that is before receiving a signal, an investor expects to be receiving either a low or
17For instance, Lee & Wahal (2004) show that the differential in underpricing as a proportion of total
underpricing is 28 percent.
29
a high signal. In case of a high signal, he makes an expected profit, with a low signal he
breaks even. Thus ex ante, he makes a profit. If the investor makes a profit, the other side
must lose money, and thus there is underpricing on average.
Consider now the case where spreads are uninformative and prices risky (as is the case
with non-VC backed issues). Then only investors with the favorable signal buy. Prices
in this case are defined so that the high-signal types earn zero expected profit (low signal
types abstain). Thus there is no underpricing on average.
6.4 Strong Commercial Banking Ties
Before going public many companies have strong, long-lasting ties with commercial banks
(relationship-banking), for instance through credit-financing. Thus if a commercial bank
organizes a long-term client’s IPO, it is reasonable to believe that through these tight bonds
the firm and the bank have exactly the same information. Only recently U.S. regulators
allowed commercial banks to offer investment banking services, including IPO underwriting.
Our model predicts that gross spreads in such IPOs will be, on average, higher than in non-
VC backed (uninformed) or VC backed (independently informed) IPOs.
Proposition 8 (Relationship Banking Spreads are Highest)
On average, spread-levels with relationship banking (identically informed firms) are higher
than with non-VC backed (uninformed) or VC backed (independently informed) firms.
Given Proposition 6, we only need to argue why spreads with uninformed firms are smaller
than those with firms that receive the same signal as the bank. When the bank and the firm
receive the same signal, the firm chooses separating spreads at which banks set high, risky,
and separating prices; see also Table 1. A high-signal firm wants to provide a sufficient
incentive for the high-signal bank to set a price at which only high-signal investors buy
(rather than a low price at which all investors buy). Moreover, the spread must be high
enough so that the low-signal firm would not mimic it. A low-signal firm also wants to
provide incentives for the low-signal bank to set a risky price. This price, despite being
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risky, is low because the spread reveals bad information. As a consequence, in both cases
spreads must be large, and this is why spreads with identically informed firms (relationship
banking) exceed those with uninformed (non-VC backed) and thus those with privately
informed (VC backed) firms.
In the relationship banking case, one may now conjecture that the low-signal firm
contemplates abandoning its commercial bank to look for an independent third-party bank,
because its equilibrium spread is the highest of all cases. However, in equilibrium this
deviation cannot be profitable. The reason is that the replacement of the relationship-bank
is publicly observable and the resulting beliefs would render this deviation unprofitable: It
is straightforward to see that the high-signal firm would not be interested in this move,
because the best that can happen is that it is perceived as a high-signal firm. But then
even the highest expected payoff it will get from working with an independent bank is,
in expectation, lower than what it gets from its commercial bank: there is the risk that
the new bank gets an unfavorable signal and charges the low price. Thus, since the high-
signal firm would not replace its relationship-bank, any change of banking-partner would
be perceived as coming from a low-signal firm which then would not want to deviate either.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a framework to integrate three empirical findings of the literature
on IPOs, namely that investment banks earn positive profits in a competitive market, that
banks receive lower gross spreads in VC backed than in non-VC backed IPOs, and that there
is more underpricing in VC-backed IPOs. We modeled the IPO procedure as a two-stage
signaling game. In the second stage banks set offer prices given their private information
and the level of the spread. Firms anticipate the bank’s pricing decision and, in the first
game stage, set spreads to maximize expected revenue. As a result, firms offer high spreads
to induce banks to set high prices, allowing them profits.
The intuition for investment banking profits and spread-setting behavior of firms is
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straightforward: Firms tentatively prefer higher prices, even if these are risky. Banks, on the
other hand, need an incentive to set high prices, and this incentive is provided by obtaining
a sufficiently high fraction of the IPO proceeds. Firms will thus not set low spreads because
otherwise the banks would set low, riskless prices. Investors know this process and derive
information from it. In the paper we showed how different informational scenarios influence
this process and lead to different spread-levels. In particular, we showed that in equilibrium
VC-backed issuing firms, which are assumed to be better informed, impose smaller spreads
but face larger underpricing than less well informed, non-VC backed firms.
There are without doubt several other forces at work that influence the setting of IPO
prices and spreads. For instance, there are repeated interactions between banks and firms
(but also investors); also, there may be (implicit) collusion between banks, reputation
building of banks (“we don’t do it for less”), or side payments (quid-pro-quo between the
issuer and the bank). We abstract from many of these interesting questions to keep the
analysis manageable. Instead we focus merely on how (asymmetric) information influences
the interaction of the setting of the offer price, the determination of the offer spread, and
the order decisions of investors.
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A Tools Used in the Analysis
Aftermarket Price Formation
An efficient market price aggregates the number of positive and negative signals about the
value of the security. The offer demand is published after securities have been issued. If
only high-signal investors buy, demand reveals the total number of good (and bad) signals.
If all investors order, stated demand is N , securities are allocated at random, but demand
is uninformative. Still, high-signal investors expect the security to be worth more than low-
signal investors and thus high-signal investors without a share-allotment are willing to buy it
from low signal investors with an allotment. Without modeling the price-finding procedure
explicitly we assume an intermediate market process takes place that reveals the number
of high signals d. For instance, high-signal investors without a share-allotment submit
unit market-buy-orders, low-signal investors with a share-allotment submit unit market-
sell-orders. All other investors abstain. Let d˜ be the number buyers and S˜ the number of
sellers. Then the number of high-signal investors is d˜+ S− S˜ and the market price pm will
again depend on the number of favorable signals d. The updated expectation of V thus
becomes the aftermarket price, pm(d) = E[V |d, µ, ν] = Pr(V = 1|d, µ, ν). The conditional
prior distribution over signals has binomial structure, Pr(d|V = 1) =
(
N
d
)
qd(1 − q)N−d.
Price-information µ about sb and ν about sf is unambiguous in a separating equilibrium.
We can therefore replace it with the conditional probability of the bank’s and the firm’s
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signal being correct, q or 1− q. Then, for instance,
pm(d|µ = 1, ν = 0) =
q(1− q)q2d−N
q(1− q)q2d−N + (1− q)q(1− q)2d−N
. (14)
Functional Form of Success Probabilities
Variable d denotes the number of orders, i.e. the number of high-signal investors. Then
conditional on V = 1, the probability that there are at least S investors is
Pr(d ≥ S|B1) =
N∑
d=S
(
N
d
)
qd(1− q)N−d, (15)
analogously for V = 0. A bank with signal sb assigns probability αsb,ν(S) to the event
that at least S investors have the favorable signal. If the bank has signal sb and spread
information ν, then
αsb,ν(S) =
N∑
d=S
(
N
d
)(
Pr(V = 1|sb, ν) · q
d(1− q)N−d + Pr(V = 0|sb, ν) · (1− q)
dqN−d
)
. (16)
Assumptions 1 and 2 then imply the success probabilities at high, risky prices as summa-
rized in Table 2.
Table 2 here.
Threshold Prices
Denote by psi,µ,ν the maximum price at which an investor with signal si and price informa-
tion µ and spread information ν buys, given all investors with s˜i ≥ si buy. At this price the
investor’s expected return from buying the security is zero, normalizing outside investment
opportunities accordingly.
Define ψ(1|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 1|si = 1, µ = 1, ν) and ψ(0|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 0|si =
1, µ = 1, ν). Consider now the structure of the conditional distribution f(d − 1|V ). For
V = 1, this is a binomial distribution over {0, . . . , N−1} with center (N−1)q, and likewise
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for V = 0 with center (N −1)(1− q). Since by Assumption 2, N is ‘large enough’ for every
q, f(d − 1|1) = 0 for d < N/2 and f(d|0) = 0 for d > N/2. When combining both
f(d−1|1) and f(d−1|0), we obtain a bi-modal function. Knowing f(d−1|V ), we can find
the probability that d− 1 other have a favorable signal to be
g(d|si, µ(p), ν(β)) :=
∑
V ∈V
Pr(V |si, µ(p), ν(β)) · f(d|V ). (17)
Thus in g(·|si, µ, ν), investors’ posterior distribution over demands, f(d−1|1) and f(d−1|0)
are weighted with ψ(1|si, µ, ν) and ψ(0|si, µ, ν). Assumption 2 now satisfies two purposes.
The first is to ensure that we pick N large enough, so that the two modes do not overlap.
The second can be seen as follows.
Lemma 2 For any q > 1
2
, there exists a number of investors N(q), such that pm(d) ·
g(d|si, µ, ν) ∈ {0, g(d|si, µ, ν)} almost everywhere.
The lemma states that market prices are mostly 0 or 1, if they are not, then the weight of
this demand is negligible. To see this consider the following heuristic argument.
Proof: pm(d) is a s-shaped function in d, given by equation (14). For large N , pm(d) ∈
{0, 1} almost everywhere. Define I∗ as the interval of d around N/2 s.t. for d ∈ I∗ we have
pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1}. pm(d) is multiplied with density g(d|si, µ, ν), which peaks at (N −1)(1− q)
and (N − 1)q. For N increasing I∗/N → 0 and the bi-modal distribution becomes more
centered around (N − 1)(1 − q) and (N − 1)q. Hence, for every q there is an (N − 1)(q)
such that for d ∈ I∗, g(d|si, µ, ν) · p
m(d) = 0, i.e. the weight on pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1} can be made
arbitrarily small. 
If only investors with favorable signals order, then for a high-signal investor, at price p
his rational-expectation payoff from buying has to be non-negative,
N−1∑
d=S
S
d
· (pm(d)− p) · g(d− 1|si = 1, µ(p), ν(β)) ≥ 0. (18)
Likewise for the respective low-signal investors when all investors order in which case the
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summation runs from 1 to N , and si = 1 is replaced by si = 0.
Using Lemma 2 we can determine the threshold prices as follows. Consider first p1,1,ν .
0 = (1− p1,1,ν)
N−1∑
d=N/2
S
d+ 1
g(d− 1|1, 1, ν)− p1,1,ν
N/2∑
d=S−1
S
d+ 1
g(d− 1|1, 1, ν)
⇔ p1,1,ν =
N−1∑
d=N/2
S
d+ 1
g(d− 1|1, 1, ν)
/ N−1∑
d=S−1
S
d+ 1
g(d− 1|1, 1, ν). (19)
For d > N/2, g(d− 1| ·) = ψ(1| ·)f(d− 1|1) and for d < N/2, g(d− 1| ·) = ψ(0| ·)f(d− 1|0).
Also define
Σ0 :=
N/2∑
d=S−1
f(d− 1|0)
d+ 1
and likewise Σ1 :=
N−1∑
d=N/2
f(d− 1|1)
d+ 1
, and σ := Σ0/Σ1. (20)
Write ℓ(µ, ν) := ψ(0|1, µ, ν)/ψ(1|1, µ, ν). Thus for the combination of signal si, price-
information µ and spread-information ν with B1 we have
p1,1,ν = (1 + σℓ(1, ν))
−1 and likewise p1, 1
2
,ν = (1 + σℓ(
1
2
, ν))−1. (21)
Consider now the case for p0,0,ν . At this price all agents receive the security with equal
probability and we sum from 0 to N − 1. Thus
0 = (1− p0,0,ν)
N−1∑
d=N/2
S
N
g(d− 1|0, 0, ν)− p0,0,ν
N/2∑
d=0
S
N
g(d− 1|0, 0, ν)
⇔ p0,0,ν = ψ(1|0, 0, ν). (22)
Likewise we have
p0, 1
2
,ν = ψ(1|0,
1
2
, ν). (23)
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Approximate Closed Form Solutions
We will now derive approximate closed form solutions so that we can solve our model
analytically. In this appendix we let d denotes the number of other investors with favorable
information — this contrasts the exposition of the main text, but it simplifies the notation
here. First consider the strategy of agent number N . There are N − 1 other investors.
Given that he invests and the true value is, say, V = 1, then by the law of large numbers,
demand/the number of favorable signals will always be larger than N/2. Furthermore, the
market price is almost surely pm(d) = 1. If d others order, then when buying he gets the
asset with probability 1/(d+ 1). Thus his payoff for price p
(1− p)
N−1∑
d=(1−q)N−1
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d = (1− p)
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d.(24)
To compute the sum we proceed in a similar manner as one would to compute the expected
value of a binomial distribution: First observe that because N is large,
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d =
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d (25)
Then we can compute
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d =
1
qN
N−1∑
d=0
N !
(N − (d+ 1))!(d+ 1)!
qd+1(1− q)N−1−d
=
1
qN
(
N∑
l=0
(
N
l
)
ql(1− q)N−l −
(
N
0
)
q0(1− q)N−0
)
=
1
qN
(1− (1− q)N). (26)
In the second step we made a change of variable, l = d + 1, but through this change, we
had to subtract the element of the sum for l = 0. Consequently, for large N , we have
N−1∑
d=N/2
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qd(1− q)N−1−d ≈
1
qN
. (27)
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Using the same arguments, we could also show that
N−1∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qN−1−d(1− q)d ≈
1
(1− q)N
. (28)
Use now familiar notation to denote the combination of private and public beliefs φs,µ.
For the time being, assume the firm is uninformed so that ν is replaced with a diamond.
Recall that we can write p1,1,⋄ as
p1,1,⋄ =
(
1 + ℓ(1, ⋄)
Σ0
Σ1
)−1
. (29)
What we now need to find is a closed form for
Σ0 =
N/2∑
d=N(1−q)−1
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qN−1−d(1− q)d. (30)
For increasingN one can see that (1/(d+1))
(
N−1
d
)
qN−1−d(1−q)d gets numerically symmetric
around (1− q)N − 1. Thus we can express
Σ0 =
1
2
N/2∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qN−1−d(1− q)d
=
1
2
N∑
d=0
1
d+ 1
(
N − 1
d
)
qN−1−d(1− q)d ≈
1
2
1
(1− q)N
. (31)
We obtain
p1,1,⋄ =
(
1 + ℓ(1, ⋄)
Σ0
Σ1
)−1
≈
(
1 +
(1− q)2
q2
qN
2(1− q)N
)−1
=
2q
1 + q
≡
q
α1,⋄
. (32)
Equivalently, we get
p1, 1
2
,⋄ ≈
(
1 +
1− q
q
qN
2(1− q)N
)−1
=
2
3
, and p1,0,⋄ ≈
1− q
α0,⋄
. (33)
The information content of a high pooling price is 1/2, and knowing this information,
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the probability of the offering being successful is 3/4. Thus the interpretation of risky prices
is thus the ratio of the expected liquidation value given price- and spread-information to
the share of successful offerings given this information
p1,µ,ν =
Pr(V = 1 | µ, ν)
Pr(IPO successful | µ, ν)
. (34)
Table 3 summarizes the approximate closed form solutions of the different prices that can
occur.
Table 3 here.
B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose p∗ > p0,0,ν . At this price only investors with signal si = 1 buy. A high-signal bank
will always set a price where at least investors with signal si = 1 buy. Hence, investors
with signal si = 1 buy at both prices p
∗ and p¯∗. A low-signal bank can now increase its
payoff by setting a higher price because α0,ν is not affected by this, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) First we show that given Conditions 1 and 2 the only separating equilibrium surviving
the intuitive criterion (IC) is the one outlined in Proposition 1(a). We then argue that
pooling cannot occur.
Step 1 (Separating): First observe that there cannot be a separating price p¯∗ with B0,1
as otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate to this price. Note that no separating price
with p¯∗ > φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) can exist because at this price, the low-signal bank would prefer to
deviate. No price p¯∗ > p1,1,ν can exist since not even investors with si = 1 would buy.
Furthermore, p¯∗ ≥ φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) must be satisfied since otherwise the high-signal bank would
deviate to p0,0,ν . Finally no price p¯
∗ below p1,0,ν is possible as the high-signal bank would
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deviate to this price. Take p˜, with max{φ1,ν(p0,0,ν), p1,0,ν} ≤ p˜ ≤ min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)}.
Note that such a p˜ always exists as long as φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) ≤ p1,1,ν and p1,0,ν ≤ φ0,ν(p0,0,ν).
Conditions 1 and 2 ensure this is the case because φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) > φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) and p1, 1
2
,ν >
p1,0,ν .
We analyze the candidate separating equilibrium
{(p∗ = p0,0,ν , µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯
∗ = p˜, µ = 1, B1);
(p∗ 6∈ {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0,ν , B1 if p0,0,ν < p ≤ p1,0,ν, B∅ else)}.
By definition of φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) it holds that
βp0,0,νS = α0,νβφ0,ν(p0,0,ν)S− (1− α0,ν)C > α0,νβp˜S− (1− α0,ν)C (35)
so that the low-signal bank would not deviate to p˜. Since max{φ1,ν(p0,0,ν), p1,0,ν} ≤ p˜, also
the high-signal bank would not deviate. Hence this is a PBE.
Now consider the application of the IC. Suppose a high separation price p¯ = ˜˜p is ob-
served, where we have p˜ < ˜˜p ≤ min{p1,1,ν, φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)}. This price is equilibrium dominated
for a low-signal bank by definition of φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). This bank can thus be excluded from
the set of potential deviators. The only remaining agent is the high-signal bank. The best
response of high-signal investors is then to buy at p¯ = ˜˜p, i.e. B1. Hence the PBE with
p¯∗ = p˜ does not survive the IC. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all separating prices
with p¯ < min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)} can be eliminated.
Step 2 (Pooling with B0,1): For all investors to buy we must have p ≤ p0, 1
2
,ν . Suppose
there was deviation to p = φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). For the low-signal bank this would not
be profitable by definition of φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). But for some beliefs about the bank’s signal and
corresponding best responses, investors with sb = 1 could be better off. The best response
for investors with beliefs on the remaining set of types, i.e. µ = 1, however, is B1 as we
have φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1,1,ν . Hence, applying the IC, there cannot be a pooling equilibrium
with B0,1.
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Step 3 (Pooling with B1): We must have p ≤ p1, 1
2
,ν. Since φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) > p1, 1
2
,ν , the
low-signal bank would prefer to deviate to p0,0,ν , hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
(b) We first argue that if Condition 1 is not fulfilled each separating equilibrium is
payoff dominated by pooling in the riskless price. Then we show that also a pooling price
with B1 is payoff dominated. We finally argue that among all PBE pooling equilibrium
prices with B0,1, only the one outlined in Proposition 1 is payoff dominant.
Step 1 (Separating): If Condition 1 is not fulfilled we have
βp0, 1
2
,νS = α1,νβφ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν)S− (1− α1,ν)C > α1,νβp1,1,νS− (1− α1,ν)C (36)
so the high-signal bank prefers pooling in p0, 1
2
,ν to the highest possible separation price
p1,1,ν . Likewise, since p0, 1
2
,ν > p0,0,ν the riskfree pooling price generates higher payoffs for
the low-signal bank. Separation is thus always payoff dominated.
Step 2 (Pooling with B1): Since the high-signal bank can profitably deviate from p1,1,ν
it can do so from p1, 1
2
,ν < p1,1,ν . Pooling with B1 can thus be no equilibrium.
Step 3 (Pooling with B0,1): Not even the high-signal bank wants to set a price where
only high-signal investors buy. Candidate prices for an equilibrium are thus only prices
with B0,1. Consider p = p˜ < p0, 1
2
,ν . Since both types of banks would prefer p = ˜˜p with
p˜ < ˜˜p < p0, 1
2
,ν Pareto-efficiency prescribes that investors must hold µ =
1
2
and thus all
investors will buy at p = ˜˜p. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all prices with p < p0, 1
2
,ν
can be eliminated.
(c) We first argue that if Condition 2 is not fulfilled every separating equilibrium is payoff
dominated. We then argue that the only pooling equilibrium with B1 is the one outlined
in Proposition 1. We finally show that pooling with B0,1 cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 1 (Separating): Since Condition 2 does not hold we have
βp0,0,νS = α0,νβφ0,ν(p0,0,ν)S− (1− α0,ν)C < α0,νβp1,1,νS− (1− α0,ν)C (37)
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so the low-signal bank will mimic the high-signal bank at any price p˜ ≥ φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). To
uphold separation the high-signal bank must lower its price below φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) < p1, 1
2
,ν .
However, a high separation price below p1, 1
2
,ν cannot be a payoff dominant equilibrium
since both types of banks would prefer pooling price p1, 1
2
,ν . There can thus be no separating
equilibrium.
Step 2 (Pooling with B1): From Step 1 we know that both types of bank prefer pooling
in p˜ ∈ [φ0,ν(p0,0,ν), p1, 1
2
,ν ] even to the separating equilibrium with the highest possible p¯.
Consider the candidate pooling price ˜˜p with p˜ < ˜˜p < p1, 1
2
,ν . Since both types prefer ˜˜p to
p˜ payoff dominance prescribes µ = 0.5 and thus p˜ cannot be an equilibrium. Applying
this reasoning repeatedly, all prices with p < p1, 1
2
,ν can be eliminated. Therefore, the only
pooling equilibrium surviving is the one depicted in Proposition 1.
Step 3 (Pooling with B0,1): Suppose, for the moment being, that p0, 1
2
,ν is a equilibrium,
supported by out-of-equilibriums belief that any deviation is by a low-signal bank. Then
consider a deviation to φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). Naturally, φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν), and thus, applying
the IC, this deviation can only be triggered by a high-signal bank. It is straightforward
to check that, numerically, a violation of Condition 2 implies that Condition 1 holds, i.e.
φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1,1,ν . Furthermore,
φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) =
p0, 1
2
,ν
α1,ν
+
1− α1,ν
α1,ν
C
βS
, (38)
which is increasing in costs C. C = βS(α0,νp0, 1
2
,ν−p0,0,ν)/(1−α0,ν) is the largest C so that
Condition 2 just holds. Any C violating Condition 2 is smaller than C. Numerically then
φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1, 1
2
,ν , thus payoff dominance holds. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
To proof the result we first show that pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄ is more profitable than separation,
i.e.
(1− βp⋄) (α0,⋄ + α1,⋄) p1, 1
2
,⋄ > (1− β
s
⋄) (α1,⋄p1,1,⋄ + p0,0,⋄)
⇔ C/N < 2q(2q − 1)2(1− q)2(1 + q − q2)/(−1 + 4q − 9q2 + 19q3 − 25q4 + 17q5 − 2q6).(39)
Second, we show that pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄ is more profitable than pooling in p0, 1
2
,⋄, i.e.
(1− βp⋄) (α0,⋄ + α1,⋄) p1, 1
2
,⋄/2 > p0, 1
2
,⋄
⇔ C/N < 2(2q − 1)(1− q)(−1 + q + 3q2 − 2q3)/3q(1− 2q + 2q2). (40)
The above transformations make use of the closed form expressions for prices and success
probabilities that are derived in Appendix A. Requiring β < 0.1 allows to cap the functions
that form the restrictions. The highest spread that arises in equilibrium is β0 as derived
in Section 4.2. It induces the identically informed low-signal bank to set the risky price.
Requiring β0 < 0.1 translates into requiring
C/N < (4q − 1− 5q2 + 2q3)/5(1− 2q + 2q2) =: R0(q). (41)
Numerically it is easy to check that for q ∈ (.6, 1), C/N < R0(q) is sufficient for (39) and
(40) to hold.
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the result, we proceed in five steps: First, we derive the firm’s payoff maximizing
spread, given spreads are separating. This step serves as benchmark for comparing devia-
tion payoffs. Second, we show that the low-signal firm would always mimic the high-signal
firm’s spread choice. Third, we show that the high-signal firm cannot defend separation in
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spreads: neither price-separation nor price-pooling inducing spreads can be upheld. Forth,
we show that there are two candidate spread-pooling equilibria. Fifth, we finally argue
that only the price-separation inducing spread satisfies the Intuitive Criterion (IC).
Table 4 shows how a firm computes expected payoffs. The results can only be obtained
numerically as payoffs are complicated polynomials that cannot be expressed in a simple,
intuitive form. Throughout the proof we require, for q ∈ (.6, 1), that C/N < R0(q) as
derived in the proof of Proposition 2.
Table 4 here.
Let βsν (β
p
ν) denote the lowest spread that yields separation (high pooling) given spread-
information ν. Spreads are computed in the same way as demonstrated in Subsection 5.1
and are given as follows.
βs1 =
1− α1,1
α1,1p1,1,1 − p0, 1
2
,1
C
S
, βs0 =
1− α0,1
α0,1p1,1,0 − p0, 1
2
,0
C
S
, βs1
2
= βs⋄,
βp1 =
1− α1,0
α1,0p1, 1
2
,1 − p0,0,1
C
S
, βp0 =
1− α0,0
α0,0p1, 1
2
,0 − p0,0,0
C
S
, βp1
2
= βp⋄ .
Step 1 (Separating Spreads): Suppose first that the spread is separating and indicates
sf = 1, i.e. ν = 1. The firm has the choice between expected profits in separation, low
riskless pooling, and high risky pooling. For given parameters q, C,N , the firm will always
choose the spread with maximal expected payoffs. Pooling in p1, 1
2
,1 is better than separation
in p1,1,1 and p0,0,1 if
(1− βp1)α1 p1, 1
2
,1 > (1− β
s
1)
(
(q2 + (1− q)2/2)p1,1,1 + 2q(1− q)p0,0,1
)
(42)
and pooling in p1, 1
2
,1 is better than pooling in p0, 1
2
,1 if
(1− βp1)α1 p1, 1
2
,1 > p0, 1
2
,1. (43)
As explicitly shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the two inequalities translate into re-
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strictions of the form C/N < R(q). Numerically, it is straightforward to check that both
inequalities hold if C/N < R0(q).
Suppose now that the spread triggers ν = 0. Again, we have to compare expected
profits. Pooling in p1, 1
2
,0 is better than separation in p1,1,0 and p0,0,0 if
(1− βp0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0 > (1− β
s
0)
(
(3/2) q(1− q)p1,1,0 + (q
2 + (1− q)2)p0,0,0
)
(44)
and pooling in p1, 1
2
,0 is better than pooling in p0, 1
2
,0 if
(1− βp0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0 > p0, 1
2
,0. (45)
Again, (44) and (45) hold if C/N < R0(q). Thus if spreads are separating, inducing high
price-pooling is better than both price-separation and low price-pooling — irrespective of
the spread-information.
Step 2 (Spread Mimicking): We now show that the low-signal firm will always mimic
the high-signal firm, and that defending separation is too costly. It is profitable to mimic
the high-signal firm in βp1 if
(1− βp1)α0 p1, 1
2
,1 > (1− β
p
0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0. (46)
Numerically the deviation profit is always higher, i.e. spread-separating in βp1 , β
p
0 cannot be
an equilibrium.
Step 3 (Defending Separating Spreads): The high-signal firm’s defenses against mim-
icking have to be analyzed for any of the three candidate equilibria: high price-pooling
inducing βp1 , price-separating inducing β
s
1, and low price-pooling inducing β = 0 would be
defended by setting higher βs. However, none of these turn out to be feasible.
(i) Defending Price-Separation: The lowest spread β˜ for which the low-signal firm will
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not mimic the price-separation inducing spread any longer, is given by
(1− β˜)
(
(3/2) q(1− q)p1,1,1 + (q
2 + (1− q)2)p0,0,1
)
= (1− βp0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0. (47)
(ii) Defending Risky Price-Pooling: If the high-signal firm sets β˜ > βp1 the low-signal
firm will no longer mimic if
(1− β˜)α0 p1, 1
2
,1 = (1− β
p
0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0. (48)
(iii) Defending Riskless Price-Pooling: If the high-signal firm sets β˜ ∈ (0, βs1) the low-
signal firm will no longer mimic if
(1− β˜) p0 1
2
,1 = (1− β
p
0)α0 p1, 1
2
,0. (49)
Solving for β˜, numerically, in all three cases it exceeds by far 10 percent. Thus, there
is no spread-separating equilibrium.
Step 4 (Pooling Spreads): As usual, there are three candidate pooling spreads: β = 0,
βs1
2
and βp1
2
. It turns out that expected profits at β = 0 are dominated by those at the other
two spreads. Consider first the high-signal firm. Price-separation is preferred to riskless
price-pooling if
(1− βs1
2
)
(
(q2 + (1− q)2/2)p1,1, 1
2
+ 2q(1− q)p0,0, 1
2
)
> p0, 1
2
, 1
2
(50)
and risky price-pooling is preferred to risk-free price-pooling if
(1− βp1
2
)α1 p1, 1
2
, 1
2
> p0, 1
2
, 1
2
. (51)
Both inequalities hold numerically, given C/N < R0(q). However, price-separation is pre-
ferred to risky price-pooling if
(1− βs1
2
)
(
(q2 + (1− q)2/2)p1,1, 1
2
+ 2q(1− q)p0,0, 1
2
)
> (1− βp1
2
)α1 p1, 1
2
, 1
2
. (52)
47
which, given C/N < R0(q), holds only for, roughly, q > .78. For smaller q, risky price-
pooling is preferred.
Consider now the low-signal firm. Risky price-pooling is preferred to riskless price-
pooling if
(1− βp1
2
)α0 p1, 1
2
, 1
2
> p0, 1
2
, 1
2
(53)
and risky price-pooling is preferred to price-separation if
(1− βp1
2
)α0 p1, 1
2
, 1
2
> (1− βs1
2
)
(
(3/2) q(1− q)p1,1, 1
2
+ ((1− q)2 + q2)p0,0, 1
2
)
. (54)
Both inequalities hold numerically, given C/N < R0(q).
Step 5 (Equilibrium Selection): Thus there are two candidates for spread-pooling equi-
libria. Conveniently, however, spread βp1
2
fails the IC. To see this, define β˜(q) to be the
spread for given q such that the low-signal firm does not wan to deviate from βp1
2
, even
if it was perceived to be the high-signal firm. Suppose a deviation to a price-separation
inducing spread. Then β˜(q) must be such that
(1− β˜(q))
(
(3/2)q(1− q)p1,1,1 + (q
2 + (1− q)2)p0,0,1
)
< (1− βp1
2
)α0 p1, 1
2
, 1
2
. (55)
Numerically, for q > 0.72, β˜(q) can be set to βs1, for smaller q, it has to be larger. However,
for all q it holds that β˜ < βˆs1 = (1 − α0,1)C/(α0,1p1,1,1 − p0,0,1)S, where βˆ
s
1 is the spread
so that the low-signal bank is indifferent between choosing p1,1,1 and p0,0,1. (Recall that
for higher spreads the high-signal bank lowers the high separation price to φ0,1(p0,0,1); see
Figure 3.) Consequently, every such β˜(q) induces price-separation with p1,1,1 and p0,0,1.
Furthermore, numerically for all q, the high-signal firm prefers to deviate to β˜(q) if it is
perceived to be the high type. Hence there is a deviation that, in the best of all worlds for
beliefs, is only profitable for the high-signal firm, thus βp1
2
fails the IC.
Consider now the price-separation inducing pooling spread and construct the same
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deviation β˜(q) as above. It turns out, however that for every q and every β˜ < 10%,
(1− β˜)
(
(3/2)q(1− q) p1,1,1 + (q
2 + (1− q)2) p0,0,1
)
>
(1− βs1
2
)
(
(3/2)q(1− q) p1,1, 1
2
+ ((1− q)2 + q2) p0,0, 1
2
)
. (56)
Any β˜ satisfying this equation with equality could be taken as a benchmark for deviation-
considerations. However, since there’s no feasible β˜ that satisfies our restrictions and
equation (56) with equality, the out-of-equilibrium belief that the deviation comes from
the low-signal firm does not fail the IC. Finally, numerically it is straightforward to check
that this out-of-equilibrium belief renders deviation unprofitable.
Consequently, the only equilibrium that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance is pooling
in spreads βs1
2
which induce price-separation. 
Proof of Proposition 4
If the firm separates in spreads, the bank’s price choice carries no extra information. Thus
in prices, µ is substituted with a diamond. For the bank’s probability assessment of a
successful IPO, spreads do not carry information, thus in αj,ν , j = 0, 1, spread-information
ν is substituted with a diamond. In Subsection 4.2, equation (6) we have derived the spreads
β0 and β1 that induce the bank to choose risky prices: The high-signal bank chooses risky
p1,⋄,1 with B1 if it is offered at least β1. The low-signal bank chooses risky p1,⋄,0 with B1 if
it is offered at least β0.
Step 1 (Risky Pricing): We have to show that both types of firm prefer the respective
bank to set those risky prices. The high-signal firm prefers the bank to set p1,⋄,1 and not
p0,⋄,1 if its expected revenue is higher at the risky price, α1,⋄(1 − β)p1,⋄,1 > p0,⋄,1. Recall
that β = 0 is sufficient for the bank to set the riskfree price. Solving for β yields that the
spread must satisfy
β1 < 1− p0,⋄,1/α1,⋄ p1,⋄,1 ⇔ C/N < (2q − 1)
2/2q. (57)
49
Applying the same reasoning to the low-signal firm, it prefers the low-signal bank to set
the risky price if α0,⋄(1− β)p1,⋄,0 > p0,⋄,0. Thus the separating threshold β0 must satisfy
β0 < 1− p0,⋄,0/α0,⋄ p1,⋄,0 ⇔ C/N < 2q(2q − 1)
2(1− q)2/(1− 2q + 2q2)2. (58)
Since β0 > β1 and since the analysis is restricted to the parameter space where spreads do
not exceed 10 percent, we impose β0 < 0.1. This translates into C/N < R0(q) as derived in
the proof of Proposition 2. Numerically it is easy to check that for q ∈ (.6, 1), C/N < R0(q)
is sufficient for (57) and (58) to hold.
Step 2 (Deviations): We have to show that there is no profitable deviation for either
firm. Consider first the low-signal firm. Since βs0 > β
s
1 and p1,⋄,0 < p1,⋄,1, it would deviate
if the low-signal bank set p1,⋄,1 given β
s
1. However, at β
s
1 the high-signal bank is indiffer-
ent between risky p1,⋄,1 and riskfree p0,⋄,1. Since the low-signal bank holds less favorable
prospects it would not set p1,⋄,1 and thus the firm’s/bank’s signal s = 0 is revealed. But in
this case βs0 is the best choice for the low-signal firm. Consider now the high-signal firm.
Since βs0 > β
s
1 and p1,⋄,0 < p1,⋄,1, it will never mimic the low-signal firm.
Step 3 (Pooling Spreads): We have to check if pooling in spreads can be an equilibrium.
With Proposition 2 we know that βp1
2
induces price-pooling in p1, 1
2
, 1
2
. Since βp1
2
> βs1 and
p1, 1
2
, 1
2
< p1,⋄,1 the high-signal firm will deviate, and it is the only one who can do so
profitably under the IC. Hence, this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 5
We show that the bank earns positive profits at all equilibrium spread levels.
Step 1 (Uninformed Firms): In this case, the spread is βp⋄ and both types of bank set
high pooling price p1, 1
2
,⋄ and incur the risk of losing C. Incentive compatibility requires that
equilibrium profits must be at least as high as worst case deviation payoffs. Both types of
bank could always set riskfree price p0,0,⋄ > 0 and receive β
p
⋄ S p0,0,⋄ > 0, thus equilibrium
profits must be positive.
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Step 2 (Independently Informed Firms): In this case, both types of firm set spread
level βs1
2
. The low-signal bank sets p0,0, 1
2
and thus receives βs1
2
S p0,0, 1
2
> 0. The high-signal
bank sets p1,1, 1
2
and the same argument as in Step 1 applies. Thus equilibrium profits must
be positive.
Step 3 (Identically Informed Firms): If sb = 0, the spread is β0 and the bank sets p1,⋄,0
and incurs the risk of losing C. Likewise, if sb = 1, the firm sets β1 and the bank sets
p1,⋄,1 and incurs the risk of losing C. In both cases, the argument in Step 1 applies. Thus
equilibrium profits must be positive. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 2 states that uninformed firms set spread level βp⋄ . From Proposition 3, the only
spread-equilibrium that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance with independently informed
firms is pooling spread βs1
2
. Numerically it is straightforward to show that βs1
2
< βp1
2
= βp⋄ .
Proof of Proposition 7
We will only show that if spreads are uninformative but prices are separating, then on
average securities are underpriced. It follows analogously that if spreads are uninformative
and the equilibrium (pooling) price risky, then on average ordering the security yields zero
profits (as outlined in the text).
When spreads are uninformative, four scenarios can occur with respect to value V ∈
{0, 1} and signal sb ∈ {0, 1}. Scenario (V = 0, sb = 0) occurs with probability q/2,
(V = 0, sb = 1) with (1 − q)/2, (V = 1, sb = 0) with (1 − q)/2 and (V = 1, sb = 1) with
q/2. When sb = 0, the bank sets price p0,0, 1
2
, with sb = 1 it sets p1,1, 1
2
. At p0,0, 1
2
, the IPO is
always successful, at p1,1, 1
2
it is always successful if V = 1, and it fails half the time when
V = 0 (because the true distribution of signals is distributed around N(1 − q) and thus
half the time, demand is too small). By the LLN if V = 0 then the market price is pm = 0,
if V = 1 it is pm = 1. The pricing error (underpricing or overpricing) is pm− p. Thus with
(V = 0, sb = 0) it is 0− p0,0, 1
2
, with (V = 0, sb = 1) it is 0− p1,1, 1
2
, with (V = 1, sb = 0) it
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is 1− p0,0, 1
2
, and with (V = 1, sb = 1) it is 1− p1,1, 1
2
. Combining this with the probabilities
of each scenario and with the probability of an successful offering, we obtain
1
2
(
q(−p0,0, 1
2
) +
1− q
2
(−p1,1, 1
2
) + (1− q)(1− p0,0, 1
2
) + q(1− p1,1, 1
2
)
)
(59)
=
1
2
(
1−
1 + q
2
p1,1, 1
2
− p0,0, 1
2
)
=
1
2
(
1− q − p0,0, 1
2
)
>
1
2
(1− q − (1− q)) = 0 
Proof of Proposition 8
From Propositions 2 and 4 we know that an uninformed firm always sets βp⋄ ; an identically
informed firm with signal sb = 0 sets β
s
0, if it has signal sb = 1 it sets β
s
1. Ex ante, the
identically informed firm gets either signal with equal probability. Thus for the claim to
be true it must hold that
1
2
βs1 +
1
2
βs0 > β
p
⋄ ⇔
1
2
1− α1
α1p1,1 − p0,1
+
1
2
1− α0
α0p1,0 − p0,0
>
1− α0
α0p1, 1
2
− p0,0
. (60)
Checking this numerically, the inequality holds for all q > 0.5. By Proposition 6, the
VC-backed firm sets even lower spreads. 
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Signals are
received.
The firm offers a
contract specifying
the spread level.
The bank sets the
offer price.
Investors decide
whether to order
or to abstain.
Shares are floated
or offering fails.
Figure 1: The Timing of the Game.
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Figure 2: The Signaling IPO-Game.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Offer Prices at Different Levels of Uninformative Spreads.
For levels of the spread below βs⋄, both types of banks pool in p
∗ = p0, 1
2
,⋄. For β ∈ [β
s
⋄, βˆ
s
⋄]
there is separation: The low-signal bank always sets p∗ = p0,0,⋄, and the high-signal bank
sets p¯∗ = p1,1,⋄ for β ∈ [β
s
⋄, βˆ
s
⋄] and p¯
∗ = φ0,⋄(p0,0,⋄) for β ∈ (βˆ
s
⋄, β
p
⋄). If β ≥ β
p
⋄ there is
pooling in p1, 1
2
,⋄.
spreads offer prices
VC backed (independently informed) pooling separating
non-VC backed (uninformed) uninformative high, risky pooling
‘relationship banking’ (identically informed) separating high, risky (uninformative)
Table 1: Spread and Price Setting for Different Classes of IPOs. Prices, at which
only high-signal investors buy, are risky (because there may not be sufficiently many in-
vestors with high signals). Independently informed firms pool in spreads but this pooling
spread induces banks to set separating prices; the high separating price is risky, the low
separating price is safe (all investors order). If the firm is uniformed then spreads are,
naturally, also uninformative; at the equilibrium spread, banks set a risky pooling price.
Finally, identically informed firms choose separating spreads; both these spreads induce
banks to set risky prices.
αsb,ν sb = 1 sb = 1/2 or ⋄ sb = 0
ν = 1
q2+(1−q)2/2
q2+(1−q)2
1+q
2
3
4
ν = 1/2 or ⋄
1+q
2
3
4
2−q
2
ν = 0 3
4
2−q
2
q2/2+(1−q)2
q2+(1−q)2
Table 2: The success probability αsb,ν for prices at which only high-signal in-
vestors buy.
si = 1 si = 0
psi,µ,ν µ = 1 µ = 1/2 or ⋄ µ = 0 µ = 1 µ = 1/2 or ⋄ µ = 0
ν = 1
2q2
(1−q)2(1+2q2/(1−q)2)
2q
1+q
2
3
2
3
2(1−q)
2−q
1− q
ν = 1/2 or ⋄
2q
1+q
2
3
2(1−q)
2−q
2(1−q)
2−q
1− q
(1−q)2
q2+(1−q)2
ν = 0 2
3
2(1−q)
2−q
1− q 1− q
(1−q)2
q2+(1−q)2
1
1+q3/(1−q)3
Table 3: Approximate closed form solutions of threshold prices psi,µ,ν. Each entry
in the table corresponds to a price psi,µ,ν , i.e. to the threshold price for each combination of
the investor’s signal si, price information µ and spread information ν. Thus the left half of
the table (under si = 1) lists the maximal price that an investor with signal si = 1 is willing
to pay, given information µ and ν and given that all others with signal si = 1 buy, and
those with si = 0 do not. The right half of the table (under si = 0) indicate the maximal
price that an investor with signal si = 0 is willing to pay, given that all others investors
buy too. For instance, if the investor receives signal si = 1 and derives spread and price
information ν = 0 and µ = 1/2, then the maximum he is willing to pay is threshold price
p1,1/2,0 = 2(1− q)/(2− q).
Pr(V |sf = 1) q 1− q
V = 1 V = 0
Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(IPO successful|V ) Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(IPO successful|V )
sb = 1 q p1,1,1 1 1− q p1,1,1
1
2
sb = 0 1− q p0,0,1 1 q p0,0,1 1
Table 4: Prices, signal probabilities, and success probabilities in price-separating
equilibria.
List of Symbols
V set of liquidation values, V = {0, 1}.
V , v element of V, realization of random variable V .
N number of potential investors.
S number of securities to be issued.
sb private signal of the investment bank, sb ∈ V.
sf private signal of the issuing firm, sb ∈ V.
si private signal of an investor, si ∈ V.
q signal quality.
µ(p) price information.
ν(β) spread-information.
d demand and also the number of favorable investor signals.
B set of aggregated best replies, B = {B1, B0,1, B∅}.
B1 all high-signal investors order.
B0,1 all investors order.
B∅ no investor orders.
αsb,ν belief of an IPO being successful in case B1, given signal sb and spread-information ν.
C exogenous costs involved if IPO fails.
β gross spread; share of IPO revenue going to the investment bank.
βpν lowest spread that induces the bank to pool in the high price, given spread-information ν.
βsν lowest spread that induces the bank to separate in prices, given spread-information ν.
βν lowest spread that induces the identically informed bank to set a risky price, given ν.
Π(·) expected profit for the investment bank.
psi,µ,ν highest price an investor is willing to pay given his
signal si, price-information µ, and spread-information ν.
p any offer price.
p¯∗, p∗ high and low offer price in a separating equilibrium.
p∗ pooling equilibrium offer price.
pm(d) aftermarket price given demand realization d.
φsb,ν(p) price s.t. bank with sb and spread-information ν is indifferent
between charging a risky φsb,ν(p) (with B1) or safe price p (with B0,1).
f(d|V ) conditional distribution over demand, given the true value is V .
g(d|si, µ, ν) conditional distribution over demand, given si, µ, and ν.
ψ(V |si, µ, ν) conditional probability of V , given si, µ, and ν.
